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Abstract 
 
I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the current predominant approach to macroeconomic modelling of 
asset prices and suggest an alternative perspective. This alternative rests on the insight that the economy is 
the result of individual decisions. The industry standard has it, however, that individual action is ruled by 
objective, general laws instead. Changing the point of view allows to reconcile numerous puzzles and paves 
the way for a promising new research agenda. 
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1. Introduction 
Many years ago the ancient Greek coined the term “eco-
nomics” which defines the principle research agenda 
until today. Today we are still concerned with decision 
making for enhancing society’s welfare. However, two 
thousand years cannot pass leaving the world unchanged. 
While in ancient Greece decisions allocated the scarce 
resources of the oikos (the household) comprising the 
master, his family, slaves, and the land, today’s nomos 
(custom) of efficient action concerns thousands of 
households, countries and the world as a whole. 
The basic objective of economic analysis has never-
theless remained largely unchanged. Economists are still 
looking for laws that can guide our behaviour to the bet-
ter of the society. The most important difference—in my 
view—between then and now certainly is the degree of 
complexity of today's issues. In a relatively little world 
with well-defined roles for individuals, a judgment of the 
effects of one's action in the future appears reasonably 
reliable. We can thus imagine that the optimal decision 
can be made considering all relevant combinations of 
action and reaction. 
Interestingly, economists still apply the same strategy 
for advancing theories when describing human behaviour, 
or prescribing the best possible choice. The umbrella 
term for this procedure is usually called rational choice. 
Individuals are assumed to decide on the basis of rational 
expectations about the future state of the economy. In its 
probably most restrictive version this approach posits the 
existence of the so-called homo oeconomicus. This hy-
pothetical agent is, among other things, completely self-
ish, profit oriented and processes an unlimited amount of 
information in no time. Not surprisingly, this methodo-
logical approximation of real humans becomes more and 
more outdated as more and more evidence is gathered 
which proves the limits of humans beyond doubt. A main 
driver of this more recent development certainly are al-
ternative analyses of decision making pioneered by re-
searchers like [1,2], for example. 
Recognising the limits of the rationality concept many 
authors have begun to consider plausible deviations from 
the rationality paradigm including (rational) learning, 
incomplete information and sentiments (see e.g. [3-5]) or 
ambiguity [6,7] to name but a few. Generally speaking, 
results derived by neighbouring sciences such as psy-
chology which explain cognitive processes have entered 
economics and have helped to better understand individ-
ual choice under more realistic assumptions [8,9]. 
Despite the significant augmentation of our under-
standing of efficient decision making, numerous prob-
lems remain. Many of them are known as puzzles be-
cause the theoretical predictions are not matched by ac-
cording observations. The puzzles I am referring to in 
particular are those in which the outcome of individual 
decisions seem not to be in line with considerations re-
lated to the aggregate of information available. Popular 
examples are all sorts of exchange rate puzzles and asset 
price puzzles such as price bubbles. Typically, these 
puzzles feed on the seemingly mismatch of theoretically 
plausible prices and their actual counterparts. In the fol-
lowing I will relate these puzzles to the predominant 
*I do thank participants of the 2009 Berlin--Copenhagen conference for 
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concept of rationality. I then put the problem in the con-
text of the traditional economists’ research program and 
finally, I will suggest a new research agenda. 
2. The Dark Side of Rationality 
Recent research into the limits of rational behaviour can 
be compared to investigations of the moon by means of 
powerful telescopes. Prior to the invention of optical 
assistance the moon appeared more or less plain and 
bright whenever the sky was clear. The same was true for 
the concept of the rational agent. Ever since, however, 
we do know there are craters, mountains, and a whole lot 
of different structures on the moon’s surface, pretty 
much as there are serious scratches on the surface of the 
homo oeconomicus. After a while astronomers also 
learned that there was a dark side of the moon too, they 
would never be able to observe while looking from the 
earth. It was not until the first lunar explorers which left 
our planet that we finally got to know the more complete 
story of the earth’s satellite. 
In my opinion, economists still await a similar en-
deavour. What remains unknown to us is the “true” story 
behind economic agent’s decisions. This story is untold 
because we can only advance theories aiming at explain-
ing behaviour but we can never know whether or not 
these theories reflect reality. Of course, there is empirical 
research which compares observations to what theories 
imply, but as mentioned earlier, key aspects of the 
economy such as exchange rate determination and asset 
pricing consistently defy satisfactory modelling giving 
rise to so-called puzzles. Why, then, can we compare 
these puzzles to lunar exploration? We can do so, be-
cause, speaking allegorically, the main approach to solve 
those puzzles rests with the development of ever better 
telescopes. What we would really need, however, is a 
glance at the dark side of the moon. 
2.1. Better Telescopes, or  
To understand this claim one may dissect the currently 
dominant empirical approach into two major parts. The 
first part comprises the collection of observations and 
their comparison to what has been expected on theoreti-
cal grounds. This part alone provides enough issues for 
discussion to fill volume after volume of high ranking 
journals. The major source for the stream of publications 
has already been identified by [10] as follows. The re-
searcher develops a model that uses (individual) expecta-
tions about the future states on the economy. The corre-
sponding empirical test  
  can be carried out only conditional on the behav-
ioural model . This means that conclusions concern-
ing the expectations process will not be invariant to the 
choice of the underlying behavioural model [10, p.22].  

Moreover, as almost always the choice of empirical 
data (definition, level of aggregation, transformations) 
itself is subject to discussion, researchers can regularly 
produce more insight based on variations of the model or 
the choice of the data. The choice of econometric tech-
niques also nourish the publication stream. Directing a 
telescope towards the moon and taking notes is an as 
comparably transparent and competitive process of 
knowledge generation as this first part of the current ap-
proach in economics. 
2.2.  Lunochod? 
The second constituent element of the current approach 
attracts far less attention, however. This element is the 
(tacit) assumption of the existence of an objective sto-
chastic probability distribution of the future states of the 
economy. Notice, as theory defines a theoretic standard 
against which actual data is to be compared to, we must 
assume that such a means of comparison exists, and 
maybe more important, this standard must be independ-
ent of the agents who are supposed to act on it. More 
precisely, objectivity is obtained by either imagining a 
representative agent or finite numbered groups of het-
erogeneous agents. As the number of agents increases the 
total outcome tends towards some objective optimal de-
cision which cannot be influenced by an individual. The 
formal condition is called ergodicity with respect to the 
number of individuals. For example, to render the fol-
lowing equation meaningful from the point of view of an 
applied economist, its error term, [epsilon], has to follow 
some ergodic stochastic process:  
 = .y f x   
Here, y represents the observation, ()f  the func-
tional form and x all conditioning information that helps 
explaining y. 
Loosely speaking, the assumption of ergodicity with 
respect to the number of agents of any unexplained por-
tion of y, that is  , can be regarded the dark side of the 
moon. We would still not know the full story of our 
earth’s companion had we not escaped the gravity of 
convenience: the familiarity with the traditional telescope 
equipment. Likewise, unless we carefully scrutinise the 
implications of ergodicity, or rather non-ergodicity we are 
unlikely to fully appreciate human behaviour from an 
economist’s point of view. 
3. Off Remote Control 
Let us reflect for a moment on the meaning of a repre-
sentative agent. Any representative agent would find out 
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that y must equal  f x  up to some agent specific mar-
gin. Considering the representative agent provides a han-
dle for coping with the individual specific effect by as-
suming that all individual effects follow some statistical 
law. In other words, there is a given probability that the 
individual specific margin does not exceed some upper 
and lower bound. Taking this assumption literally im-
plies, however, that the subject is somehow ruled by a 
law that dominates his or her own will. Consequently, we 
cannot talk about subjects any more, the representative 
agent turns into an object. Considering heterogeneous 
agents instead does not change the principle as long as 
the degree of heterogeneity is finite. 
The representative agent approach yields a bizarre re-
sult when applied to asset markets. Before turning to this 
issue let me first remind the reader that concepts like 
bubbles, and exuberance, and so on and so forth all tac-
itly assume the existence of a correct, or true, or rational, 
or fundamental value of some financial asset. Unless we 
know this true price we cannot, however, attach the label 
“bubble” to prices exceeding this rational price, for ex-
ample. According to the standard approach, any trader 
would agree on the price y. However, this price is deter-
mined completely independent of the trader’s opinion. 
Therefore, when striking a deal this very trader is ulti-
mately supposed to work on a kind of remote control. In 
my view, this is a totally misleading, even bizarre picture 
of what is really going on. 
4. The New Null 
Let me therefore suggest an alternative. This alternative 
starts with the simple observation that prices are set by 
humans. These subjects act on the basis of certain ex-
ogenous conditions and their own will. Prices are thus 
the result of subjective judgements but not the outcome 
of some independent, objective process. Secondly, for a 
price to be quoted at least two subjects must interact. In 
1836 David Ricardo already argued that a deal will only 
be beneficial when the parties involved are different, not 
identical. The same is true for asset prices. There is 
scope for a deal if the traders differ in their judgment 
about the perspectives of the future asset price. If we let 
the number of market participants increase, we should 
therefore expect that the degree of disagreement in-
creases but not decreases like the representative agent 
approach has it. 
This increase in the degree of disagreement leads di-
rectly to a new null hypothesis under which we may have 
a second look on existing empirical findings. If it was 
true that the number of agents in a market matters for the 
price process we should observe that the variance of the 
observed price increases the more agents are active. By 
contrast, the representative agent approach would sug-
gest that the variance of the average price decreases. 
5. Reconciliation 
If there ever was a chance to measure directly the rela-
tionship between the number of agents and the variance 
of the asset price, for example, we would easily be able 
to reject or accept this hypothesis. However, there are 
considerable hassles to overcome because it is very dif-
ficult to control for the number of people interacting. In 
my opinion, experiments are the potentially most pow-
erful tools in that respect. Therefore, I scanned the exist-
ing literature in order to look if a suitable experiment has 
ever been conducted. Unfortunately, I did not find any. 
What I found instead are numerous examples where it 
has been demonstrated how irrational price setting can 
become. 
So-called irrational behaviour can now be considered a 
stylised fact in artificial asset markets (see inter alia [1, 
11]). It has also be demonstrated ([12-14]), however, that 
experienced traders can push the market price towards its 
fundamental value and hence eradicate irrational prices. 
Notably, all these experiments use a design where an 
(implicit) objective price process is induced. For exam-
ple, the traded asset may yield a return with a given 
probability each period. Therefore, irrationality in such a 
situation might be used as an argument against the new 
null. I prefer a different interpretation, however. The 
participants in these experiment behave exactly as they 
would have done in the real world: they trade as if there 
was no objective price process. By contrast, expert trad-
ers are able to discover the induced pricing rule and 
hence tend to behave rationally. Therefore, these ex-
periments do not lend support to the standard approach. 
The decisive question is how do experts trade in the ab-
sence of an objective price process? In sum, standard 
experiments, that is those in the vain of [1], use objective 
price processes whose very existence is hence not test-
able. 
Because suitable experimental evidence is not (yet) 
available one may wonder if there are other bits and 
pieces of evidence for or against the new null hypothesis. 
In the following, I will focus on support while leaving 
the search for contradictions to future research. As long 
as direct tests of the relation between number of agents 
and variance have not been conducted we have to resort 
to various kinds of approximations. There are two kinds 
of approximation which I consider helpful. These are in 
the case of asset prices volume traded and size (length) 
of the order book. For example, [15] point out that the 
forward market is far less liquid than the spot market for 
foreign exchange to the effect that price volatility on the 
former is much smaller than on the latter market. There-
fore, any regression of changes in spot rates on changes 
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in forward rates (or forward-spot differences) can yield 
any result and is ultimately meaningless. Similarly, [16] 
report per-minute-data of the deutschmark—USD market 
where volume and volatility are clearly positively asso-
ciated. 
The use of order book data has been popularised by 
[17]. These authors show that the regression fit of ex-
change rate models increases dramatically when order 
book information is included. At the same time signifi-
cance of “fundamentals” decreases considerably, or dis-
appears completely. The regression fits the data better 
because the variance of the price is better captured. Us-
ing the size of the order book as an approximation to the 
number of traders active allows us to understand this 
effect in terms of the subjective pricing process. 
In a further analysis, I have also run several regres-
sions of share price volatility on the number of ticks per 
ten-minute-time interval as an approximation to the 
number of agents [18]. Again, the result is a clear posi-
tive link between these two variables. 
Finally, I would like to hint to the notorious intra-day 
seasonality of financial market data. It is a well-estab-
lished fact [19,20] that share price volatility drops around 
noon. This effect has been labelled lunch break puzzle. 
Under the new null hypothesis this puzzle disappears, 
however. The solution is straightforward: when traders 
have lunch they are not active on the market any more. 
We should therefore expect volatility to drop. It might be 
worth emphasising that the lunch break puzzle is so use-
ful in support of the new null hypothesis because en-
dogeneity bias is out of the question. Lunch is an exoge-
nous event and any feedback from volatility to the oc-
currence of lunch time can be safely excluded. 
6. The Unexpectable 
In the light of the tentative evidence let us operate under 
the assumption that the new null hypothesis holds and 
have a look at its implications. One implication affects 
the use of the term rationality of agents. If certain events 
are generic in the sense that subjective judgements de-
termine their outcomes such as the pricing of assets, we 
would rationally conclude that an objective solution for 
determining these outcomes does not exist. Hence look-
ing (only) in the direction of rational, representative 
agent models for predicting those outcomes becomes 
irrational itself. 
Secondly, because the outcome of human interaction 
on markets is ultimately subjective and not objective, 
objective probability distribution functions are of very 
limited use in general. Lack of any such probability dis-
tribution implies that there are things which are not only 
very difficult to expect but which are even unexpectable. 
Is this conclusion worrisome? I don’t think so. First of all, 
life is life-threatening anyway. In other words, the future 
is open and no-one really knows, what it will bring. De-
spite this fact the human race has been able to survive 
some one or two billions of years. Most of this time hu-
mans were happy without the concept of rational deci-
sion making in the modern economists' sense. Therefore, 
humans must have developed some tools for coping with 
the unexpectable which hence still await their discovery 
by economists. 
7. Our Economy 
Economic agents somehow have to cope with the unex-
pectable. These unexpectable events are in turn the result 
of the very subjects’ judgements and actions. In one 
word, the economy is shaped by ourselves and we do 
create the reality we live in ourselves. After all, it is our 
economy and nothing else. This statement is, of course in 
stark contrast to the many attempts of modelling ex-
change rates, share prices, and the whole economy as 
chains of events following objective probability distribu-
tions. Provided the existence of the unexpectable we 
might wonder what the implication for economic analy-
ses may be. In the following, I will raise some aspects I 
consider worth a more detailed investigation. 
First of all, I do not think that under the new null hy-
pothesis representative agent models, or their ambigu-
ity-augmented versions are totally useless or wrong al-
together. The only adjustment that I deem necessary is 
the way we look at the respective findings and at what 
else we might be able to find. Let us reconsider the idea 
of the future being open. When things are fundamentally 
unexpectable while our day-to-day decisions are still 
based on guesses of what tomorrow will bring, we real-
ize that individuals must use some mechanisms to either 
formulate those guesses or to find some other way to 
cope with the same problem. The principal agent ap-
proach can thus be regarded as one single option out of a 
whole arsenal of weapons which arm us for coping with 
the unforeseeable. In this particular case, we try to ra-
tionalise our actions and decisions to the greatest possi-
ble extent on the basis of statistical analyses of past 
events. 
Once we take comfort in accepting the traditional ra-
tional expectation—representative agent approach as one 
out of many possibilities for understanding economic 
decisions, the next obvious question is: what are the 
other tools? In my opinion, the search for these alterna-
tives is the true challenge of future economic research. 
Luckily, economics has already become a very well di-
versified science. Therefore, many mechanisms which 
help us making efficient use of resources when events 
are unexpectable have probably already been investi-
gated. Those mechanisms could therefore simply been 
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reconsidered as part of the larger arsenal. There is no 
reason any more, however, to give priority to one par-
ticular line of argument like rational expectations of a 
representative agent. 
In order to illustrate the last point consider the popular 
competition between so-called fundamentalists and so- 
called chartists. The traditional rational expectation ap-
proach would clearly favour the analysis of fundamentals 
for explaining stock prices. If we take into account, 
however, that chartist create as much reality as do fun-
damentalists, there is no reason to consider the analysis 
of fundamentals a priori more reasonable than the con-
clusions drawn by chartists. Instead, we should search 
for arguments as to why either method is more suitable 
to handle the unexpectable; the answer to which is yet to 
be found. 
To provide another example, the thought that agents 
create the reality they have to deal with themselves 
brings back a number of issues economists have long 
regarded more or less settled. Consider for instance 
[21]’s case for flexible exchange rates. Six out of seven 
reasons Friedman gives for the determination of ex-
change rates can directly be used as arguments in favour 
of flexible foreign exchange prices. The reasons are al-
ways that exchange rates adjust to external, macroeco-
nomic imbalances and vice versa which re-establish 
macroeconomic equilibrium. The assumption of such a 
bi-directional feedback mechanism is at the heart of 
many exchange rate puzzles, however. Under the new 
null hypothesis, a straightforward feedback from macro-
economic conditions to exchange rates does no longer 
exist. Therefore, any short-cut to favouring flexible rates 
becomes doubtful. Again, there is no a priori reason ei-
ther to jump to the conclusion that fixed rates are better. 
But we certainly have to consider the whole issue again 
under the new null hypothesis. 
8. Points of Departure 
Returning to the subjectivity notion one might remember 
that psychologists have long noticed that decision mak-
ing is a complex process which does not only involve 
those areas of the brain that are responsible for calcula-
tion and thorough reasoning. In fact, humans can lose 
their ability to make a decision completely once the af-
fective part of the brain is seriously damaged. It might 
very well be that the evolution has reserved a decisive 
role for emotions exactly because they equip us with the 
ability to cope with unexpectable events. 
Further relevant, seemingly irrational influence on de-
cision making can be attributed to a tendency of neglect-
ing information which runs against one’s initial convic-
tions (see Section 5, third paragraph), using irrelevant 
“anchor” information, being more considerate when in a 
sad mood, being overwhelmed by too much information, 
and many more. Obviously, once we confront these be-
havioural pattern with well-defined problems of stochas-
tic optimisation we tend to find them utterly ridiculous. 
What we disregard in those comparisons, however, is the 
simple fact that well-defined problems rarely exist in real 
life. Therefore, economists should look at seemingly 
irrational patterns in the light of unexpectable events. 
Coming finally back to the initial example of an an-
cient Greek household, one possible answer to the unex-
pectable might have been given by societies which as-
sign very well-defined roles to certain members of the 
society such as women, men, children, craftsmen, priests, 
aristocrats, and so on. Assigning these roles limits the 
possible outcomes of human interaction and hence re-
duces the occurrence of unexpectable events. Therefore, 
such a strategy might benefit the society by making un-
wanted unexpected events impossible. At the same time 
desirable unexpectable events such as economic devel-
opment are also restricted. Hence, a classical trade-off 
results. If the outcome of a strategic choice is fundamen-
tally uncertain, or unexpectable, non-classical tools for 
analysing this choice must be developed and applied. 
9. Summary and Conclusions 
The outcome of human decisions and actions is as di-
verse as humans are different from one another. There-
fore, the outcomes are inherently subjective and system-
atically defy modelling by means of objective, stochastic 
processes. Observable human behaviour might hence be 
optimal in the sense that it is efficient given the occur-
rence of unexpectable events while appearing at the same 
time “irrational” in laboratory settings. 
Traditional economic modelling can be regarded an 
approximation to the actual optimisation behaviour under 
the restriction that events are following some objective 
rules. However, to fully appreciate economic decision 
making we have to scrutinise individuals’ behaviour 
given that they also have to cope with the unexpectable. 
The results of these investigation will potentially yield 
important implications for policy making and theoretical 
research alike. 
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